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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Agency theorists interpret companies‟ strategies by 
analyzing the conflict arising from the separation 
between ownership and control (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). In fact, managers have a strong motivation to 
perform active acquisitions (mergers and 
acquisitions, M&As) (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & 
Lester, 2010), drawing on the company‟s liquidity 
instead of distributing it to owners (Jensen, 1986) 
and thereby conflicting with shareholders‟ interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In so doing, managers 
aim to increase their personal prestige and fees 
(Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002) and to 
achieve private benefits (Ben-Amar & André, 2006). 
However, a high ownership concentration and 
owner-manager identification mitigate principal-
agent conflicts. Both characteristics are present in 
family firms (FFs) (Caprio, Croci, & Del Giudice, 
2011), as the family members are usually involved in 
ownership and management (Gnan & Songini, 2014). 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship 
theory acknowledges the reduction of corporate 
governance conflicts in FFs (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997). A high level of family involvement 
(FI) facilitates the overlap between a firm‟s and a 
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managers‟ objectives (Zahra, 2005). From this 
perspective, managers are not self-interested but 
follow the company‟s and the family‟s interest (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). 
Although the two theories interpret managers‟ 
behavior by relying on different assumptions, they 
converge in the case of FFs, as they assume 
alignment between the objectives of the family, 
company, and management (Chrisman, Chua, 
Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007). In this view, the 
strategic objectives of FFs, pursued via M&As, can 
diverge from those of other companies owing to the 
different level of family involvement ownership (FIO) 
and family involvement in management (FIM) 
(Chung, 2014). 
In addition, FFs‟ particular connotation 
represents a distinctive condition in the choice of 
strategy types (Oesterle, Richta, & Fisch, 2013), such 
as diversification, concentration, or 
internationalization. In that sense, some acquisition 
strategies better represent a corporate culture aimed 
at risk reduction and company preservation (Chen & 
Yu, 2012). In fact, some scholars consider 
diversifying or cross-border acquisitions as a way to 
reduce risk and create value (Miller et al., 2010; 
Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2012), while others 
view these strategies as a way to enhance 
professional managers‟ prestige (Oesterle et al., 
2013). 
Although previous literature provides some 
evidence of the FI–internationalization linkage, this 
issue remains poorly explored (Zahra, 2003). 
Recalling the stagnation view of family members, 
some scholars hypothesize a different 
internationalization propensity for FFs compared to 
non-family firms (NFFs) (Segaro, 2010; Calabrò, 
Torchia, Pukall, & Mussolino, 2013). However, 
studies on this topic present contrasting evidence 
(Zahra, 2003; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper, 
2012) and ambiguous results with regard to these 
strategies‟ goals (Miller et al., 2010). 
In addition, agency conflict reduction arising 
from FI may be a determining factor for post-deal 
performance achievement. Capital markets 
positively receive family owner-manager alignment, 
resulting in better post-M&A performance (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003a). The alignment of interests ensures 
that family managers aim to select only good 
acquisitions (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013). 
Despite the increasing attention in the 
literature to FFs‟ propensity to make acquisitions, 
the influence of the degree of FI in acquisition 
decisions is not clearly defined (Miller et al., 2010), 
even though this influence is supposed to be a 
crucial factor for some strategic choices (Calabrò et 
al., 2013). The research gap appears wider if we 
consider that the literature focuses less on the 
relationship between ownership, FI, and acquisition 
types. Following Oesterle et al. (2013), we recognize 
the importance of investigating, from an agency 
perspective, the linkage between ownership identity 
and implemented strategies. In that regard, we focus 
both on the different types of behavior of FFs and 
NFFs and on the impact of the degree of FI on 
diversification, concentration, and 
internationalization strategies. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies that investigate the 
relationship between concentrated acquisitions and 
FI. Moreover, considering the impact of FI on cross-
border strategies, the literature is based mainly on a 
concept of internationalization that does not directly 
refer to cross-border acquisitions (i.e., exports, 
imports, and foreign distribution) (Sciascia et al., 
2012; Calabrò et al., 2013; Mitter, Duller, & 
Feldbauer-Durstmüller, 2014; Zhang, Ma, Wang, Li, & 
Huo, 2016). Differently to prior research, the aims of 
this study is to deepen that relationship, 
contextualizing the analysis by using M&As. 
Research on FFs‟ cross-border acquisitions is not 
very thorough (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 
2000; Zaefarian, Eng, & Tasavori, 2016), although 
these operations involve some important 
implications that may reveal how the particular 
nature of FFs can favor or hinder such complex 
growth processes. Further in-depth analysis is 
required on the relationship between the family 
nature of the company and post-acquisition 
performance since previous studies present mixed 
results (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010). In 
fact, the research is mainly oriented toward post-
announcement market performance (e.g. De Beule & 
Sels, 2016). Therefore, the literature regarding the 
impact of FI on both accounting and market post-
deal performance is scant. 
Starting from the assumptions of Berrone et al. 
(2012), stating that companies‟ ownership structure 
influences the decisions regarding M&A activity, and 
of Caprio et al. (2011), postulating that FI is a 
particular determinant of strategic choices, we first 
investigate whether FFs have a different acquisition 
propensity to NFFs and evaluating the role of FIO 
and FIM in FF acquisition strategies. Second, we 
make assumptions about whether FFs and NFFs 
present different attitudes toward diversification, 
concentration, and internationalization strategies 
pursued through M&As, and the sign of the 
relationship between FI and M&A type concluded by 
FFs. Finally, we investigate whether being an FF may 
influence the acquirers‟ post-deal performance, from 
both a market and financial perspective, and if these 
performances are related to FI. 
Therefore, our main research question is: do 
FFs differ from NFFs as to M&A propensity, type, 
and performance? 
Our empirical analysis investigates these issues 
by adopting a sample of 141 Italian listed companies 
from 2005 to 2011, which includes the strongest 
effects of the global financial crisis, whereas most of 
the prior studies were developed under normal 
market conditions. The financial crisis may play an 
important role in the abovementioned strategic 
choices and in post-acquisition performance, for 
example, by limiting access to funding sources 
(Kestens, Van Cauwenberge, & Vander Bauwhede, 
2012). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 shows the main research 
hypotheses supported by a literature analysis. 
Section 3 describes the data collection process and 
variables used for the empirical investigation. 
Section 4 presents the statistical methodology and 
the main results. Section 5 discusses the findings 
and limitations and propose directions for future 
research. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Family firms, family involvement, and 
acquisition propensity 
 
Although Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2004) and 
Chrisman et al. (2007) show that FFs are not immune 
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from agency conflicts, the family nature and high 
ownership concentration (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1988) specific to FFs favor the formation of boards 
capable of supporting owners‟ decisions and of 
ensuring that executives act on behalf of the family 
(Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011), 
thereby reducing the principal-agent conflict. 
Considering that acquisitions embody the owner-
manager agency conflict (Jensen, 1986; 1988), the 
company‟s family nature is a determinant in 
constraining managers‟ self-interested deals 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Oesterle et al., 2013). The 
literature recognizes the family‟s conservative 
behavior in managing its firms and its orientation 
toward preserving the longevity of the business 
(Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), in order to foster the 
company‟s continuity and stability and facilitate 
generational change (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This 
implies risk aversion (Basu, Dimitrova, & Paeglis, 
2009; Zaefarian et al., 2016), geared to maintaining 
the current situation, rather than making 
acquisitions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Zahra, 2005; 
Miller et al., 2010). Moreover, self-imposed family 
managers‟ selection, due to nepotism and 
entrenchment, generates managerial incompetence 
(Chrisman et al., 2004), which boosts perceived 
uncertainty and risk, limiting the implementation of 
risky deals (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2011) interpret FFs‟ strategic choices 
and their risk-taking attitudes from a perspective 
neglected by agency theorists; that is, FFs and NFFs 
differ because they aim to preserve their socio-
emotional wealth (SEW), namely, the non-economic 
aspects of the business (Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), such as emotional 
attachment, family control, and reputation. In this 
view, SEW influences FFs‟ strategic choices even 
when it contrasts with the economic purposes. Risk 
attitude is a subjective aspect of decision makers. In 
fact, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) state that family 
principals favor risky strategies when these aim 
toward SEW preservation. However, in the specific 
case of M&As, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) postulate 
that acquisition activity threatens SEW, thereby 
supporting the hypothesis that FFs show lower 
acquisition propensity. 
In addition, Corbetta and Salvato (2004) argue 
that FFs‟ willingness to pursue non-economic goals 
enhances the alignment of managers‟ goals with 
owners‟ interests. This aspect recalls the link 
between agency and stewardship theory with 
reference to FFs. Even though the two theories 
follow different assumptions, they converge 
regarding family owners‟ and managers‟ alignment 
of interests, both geared to the pursuit of non-
financial goals. In this situation, agency conflict 
tends to zero and family managers act as family 
principal‟s stewards (Chrisman et al., 2007). 
Empirical evidence confirms these theories, 
showing lower propensity to acquire by FFs than by 
NFFs (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; Miller et al., 2010; 
Lins, Volpin, & Wagner, 2013; Trasobares & Gorriz, 
2015). Moreover, some results demonstrate that this 
propensity is inversely related to family ownership 
size (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio et al., 
2011; Calabrò et al., 2013). Following these 
arguments, we investigate the impact of two FI 
determinants (family ownership and family presence 
in the executive committee) on M&As and we 
hypothesize as follows. 
H1a: FFs show a lower acquisition propensity 
than NFFs. 
H1b: FFs with a higher level of FIO show a lower 
acquisition propensity. 
H1c: FFs with a higher level of FIM show a lower 
acquisition propensity. 
 
2.2.  Family firms, family involvement, and M&A 
type 
 
Diversifying acquisitions is aimed mainly at reducing 
income variability and risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; 
Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010; Chen & Yu, 2012), thereby favoring the 
achievement of FF objectives oriented toward risk 
minimization (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Zaefrian et 
al., 2016) and reduction of earnings volatility (Hautz, 
Mayer, & Stadler, 2013). The desire to reduce their 
personal risk, without diluting the control of their 
firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010; Miller et al., 2010; Caprio et al., 2011), is 
pursued by investing in companies with different 
core businesses (André et al., 2014). Although the 
aforementioned theoretical considerations mainly 
suggest greater FF propensity to realize 
diversification of M&As, empirical evidence does not 
support this assumption unanimously (André et al., 
2014), and indeed family shareholders often present 
undiversified portfolios, almost solely invested in 
their controlled companies (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 
2008; Hautz et al., 2013). While Miller et al. (2010) 
find there is higher propensity to diversify by FFs 
compared to NFFs, as a way to reduce risk, Caprio et 
al. (2011) demonstrate there is lower propensity to 
diversify by FFs compared to NFFs to pursue 
diversification and cross-border takeovers. Likewise, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) demonstrate a negative 
relationship between family ownership and 
diversification. Therefore, a different rationale leads 
to the assumption that FFs may limit diversification 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2010), including the 
possibility of diluting SEW and the need for 
management expertise, which is not always available 
in FFs. In that sense, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) state 
that FFs consider diversification as a way to reduce 
risk, thereby preserving SEW, only in critical 
conditions. Finally, by closely observing the Italian 
context in the observed period, we consider the role 
of the financial crisis, which highlighted the need to 
implement a strategy that contributes to company 
survival (Karim & Mitchell, 2000) and to risk 
reduction (Miller et al., 2010). Consistent with the 
abovementioned arguments, we hypothesize as 
follows. 
H2a: Diversification strategies are less likely to 
occur in FFs than in NFFs. 
Replicating the previously proposed model, we 
investigate the impact of FIO and FIM on diversifying 
strategies pursued by FFs, formulating the following 
hypotheses. 
H2b: FFs with a higher level of FIO are less likely 
to engage in diversifying M&As. 
H2c: FFs with a higher level of FIM are less likely 
to engage in diversifying M&As. 
The FFs‟ conservative objectives, that is, 
company survival and the succession of future 
generations (Miller et al., 2010) do not appear 
consistent with the implementation of concentration 
strategies. Indeed, although concentration strategies 
generate some positive effects, such as scale 
economies, market and financial synergies, and 
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production or transaction cost saving (Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987), such strategies may produce some 
disadvantages: reduction of company flexibility and 
consequent risk increase or additional costs for the 
development of synergies (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
The foregoing considerations lead us to believe that 
more risk-averse companies, such as FFs, may 
present lower propensity to realize concentration 
strategies, which may limit their flexibility, 
especially in crisis periods. 
H3a: Concentration strategies are less likely to 
occur in FFs than in NFFs. 
H3b: FFs with a higher level of FIO are less likely 
to engage in concentrated M&As. 
H3c: FFs with a higher level of FIM are less likely 
to engage in concentrated M&As. 
Although FFs‟ reduction of agency conflict 
could facilitate the implementation of long-term 
strategies, such as internationalization (Harris, 
Martinez, & Ward, 1994; James, 1999), previous 
studies show a lower preference for these strategies 
for companies with higher levels of FIO (Menéndez-
Requejo, 2005; Sciascia et al., 2012) as a result of 
their lower risk appetite (Zahra, 2005). Indeed, 
despite the ability to achieve favorable long-term 
performances (Zahra, 2003), FFs fear difficult 
integration between companies operating in 
different countries and lack of accurate information 
regarding foreign markets (Sciascia et al., 2012). 
Cross-border acquisitions involve companies dealing 
with different cultures, which may be in contrast to 
an FF‟s socio-emotional needs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). Consistent with the described theoretical 
framework, we formulate the following hypotheses. 
H4a: Internationalization strategies are less 
likely to occur in FFs than in NFFs.  
H4b: FFs with a higher level of FIO are less likely 
to engage in cross-border M&As. 
H4c: FFs with a higher level of FIM are less likely 
to engage in cross-border M&As. 
 
2.3. Family firms, family involvement, and post-
acquisition performance 
 
Previous literature underlines that family owners‟ 
and managers‟ goal alignment results in the more 
careful choice of targets (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 
2013). According to Chen and Hsu (2009), greater 
caution in investment selection is supported by the 
long-term vision of family members and results in a 
positive effect on acquisition output. Indeed, André 
et al. (2014) reveal that agency conflict negatively 
affects post-announcement market performance. 
Since the literature recognizes that the FF business 
model attenuates this conflict (Ben-Amar & André, 
2006), it is reasonable to assume that FFs achieve 
better post-deal performance. From this perspective, 
Ben-Amar and André (2006), Basu et al. (2009) and 
Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) find that 
FFs achieve better results than NFFs. In addition, 
Bouzgarrou and Navatte (2013) find that FFs 
outperform NFFs. 
Our literature analysis suggests that the linkage 
between the acquiring company‟s family nature and 
its post-deal performance is an open question. In 
addition, the acquisition types (i.e. concentration, 
diversification, or internationalization) will affect 
performance differently. For that reason, we 
formulate the following non-directional hypothesis. 
H5a: Being an FF influences post-M&A 
performance according to the acquisition type. 
Focusing on FFs, we hypothesize different 
relationships when considering the extent of FIO and 
FIM. Some scholars (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & 
Lang, 2002) recognize family owners‟ willingness to 
extract private benefits through M&As. From that 
perspective, Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) find a 
negative relationship between FIO and post-
acquisition performance. Moreover, family managers 
do not hold suitable skills to manage such complex 
operations (managerial incompetence) and difficult 
post-acquisition integration processes (Zahra, 2005) 
compared to professional managers, limiting the 
success of the deal (Volpin, 2002; Ward, 2004). 
Therefore, we expect better performances when FIM 
is lower. In particular, we follow the literature that 
assumes a positive impact on the post-deal 
performance of agency conflict reduction, owing to a 
higher level of FIO. In fact, Caprio et al. (2011), find 
that contrasts between owners and managers result 
in negative market reactions to a deal‟s 
announcement. At the same time, we aim to test if 
FIM, despite contributing to the reduction of agency 
conflicts, has a negative impact on the deals‟ output, 
due to scarce family managers‟ expertise and 
managerial honest incompetence (Chrisman et 
al., 2004) consequent to self-imposed manager 
selection. 
H5b: The level of FIO influences post-M&A 
performance according to the acquisition type. 
H5c: The level of FIM influences post-M&A 
performance according to the acquisition type. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Empirical research context 
 
Our empirical analysis is performed on the Italian 
context, which represents an ideal scenario for the 
aims of this study. First, as shown in subsection 4.1 
(descriptive statistics), there is a large number of 
family-controlled firms among Italian listed 
companies. Italian families are strongly committed 
to their businesses and are highly involved in 
management so that both the chairperson of the 
board of directors and the CEO are often part of the 
controlling family. Moreover, a large proportion of 
the controlling family‟s wealth is invested in the 
company (Bianchi & Enriques, 1999; Volpin, 2002). 
As a result, Italian controlling families tend to 
maintain long-term controlling interests in the firm 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). For these reasons, 
Italy is an eligible candidate for the analysis of the 
impact of familiness on a company‟s strategic 
choices. 
Second, the Italian setting is suitable for 
studying acquisition strategies. Low investor 
protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1998), underdeveloped equity markets, and 
very high ownership concentration characterize 
Italian corporate governance regimes (Volpin, 2002), 
increasing the risk of unsuccessful operations (Feito-
Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010). In this context, 
minority shareholders need higher returns on their 
invested capital (Rossi & Volpin, 2004). 
Third, the global financial crisis particularly 
affected Italian companies, resulting in increased 
risk perception. This might contribute to a reduction 
in active deals and might favor passive acquisitions 
since it is more frequent to find undervalued target 
firms (Rossi & Volpin, 2004). Considering the family 
nature of a company, Lins et al. (2013) show that 
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during a crisis, FFs reduce investment more than 
NFFs do. As suggested by Wan and Yiu (2009), 
environmental shock can offer companies that are 
more farsighted some growth opportunities. Finally, 
according to the resource-based perspective, Karim 
and Mitchell (2000) show that acquisitions those 
enable a company to obtain valuable resources and 
capabilities represent a strategy for survival in crisis 
periods. 
 
3.2. Research design and sample selection 
 
While most studies illustrate the acquisition 
behavior of FFs as opposed to NFFs, this research 
adds an analysis within FFs. Hence, for each of the 
three main research issues (i.e., acquisition 
propensity, acquisition type, and acquisition 
performance), we first investigated whether it 
depends on being an FF (from H1a to H5a). Second, 
we went further by investigating the relationship 
between FI and acquisition activity (from H1b-c to 
H5b-c), using a set of variables proxying for the level 
of FIO and FIM, and thereby overcoming the 
definition of familiness as a dichotomous variable 
(Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002). 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 
companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange 
continuously from 2005 to 2011. Following Sraer & 
Tesmar (2007), we exclude financial and real estate 
companies. The final sample dimension is 141 
companies, representing 43% of the population (in 
December, 2011 the total number of listed 
companies was 328). Although this sample 
equals 987 observations across the 7-year period 
considered in this study, some missing values on 
control variables made the final sample size lower in 
terms of observations. In addition, when we analyze 
post-M&A performance, the sample considers only 
firms with at least one M&A for a given year. 
 
3.3. Data collection 
 
3.3.1. Data on acquisitions 
 
Acquisition propensity is proxied by the yearly 
number of M&As, as provided by the Zephyr (Bureau 
van Dijk) database1. In order to identify the different 
strategies pursued by the acquiring companies, we 
compared the bidder‟s and the target‟s industry 
(based on the four-digit statistical classification of 
economic activities in the European Community, 
NACE REV. 2), and observed foreign target 
companies. Therefore, an internationalization 
strategy is present when a cross-border acquisition 
is realized (i.e., the target operates abroad); a 
concentration strategy is present when the target 
company shows some horizontal or vertical 
relationships with the bidder, such as similar 
products and resource sharing, or when the two 
companies vertically integrate their activities 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981); finally, a conglomerate 
diversification strategy is present when the bidder 
and target companies have different core businesses 
(Miller et al., 2010; Chen & Yu, 2012). 
                                                          
1 Our data are derived from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr merger and acquisition 
database (henceforth Zephyr), which also provides comprehensive coverage 
of European acquisition deals. According to Huyghebaert and Luypaert 
(2010), Zephyr “covers deals of smaller value and has a better coverage of 
European transactions” (p. 395). This database was used also by Von Eije and 
Wiegerinck (2010), Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011), and De Beule and 
Duanmu (2012). 
3.3.2. Data on family firms and FI 
 
In order to distinguish FFs from NFFs, we considered 
both family ownership and family presence in 
management. According to our definition, FFs are 
those in which either: 1) shares held by the family 
are equal to at least 50% + 1 share of the capital 
(family ownership >0.5) (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 
2013); or 2) at least one of the family members holds 
a business interest of at least 20% (Klasa, 2007) and 
at least one of the family members participates in 
the board of directors (0.20≤family ownership≤0.50 
and family board>0). We assumed that family 
members are those related by kinship, affinity, or 
marriage. 
The choice of a high threshold for the family 
ownership in the first criterion is due to the 
characteristic of the Italian capital market (Barontini 
& Caprio, 2006; Zattoni, 1999). The second criterion 
allows us to consider as FFs the companies that are 
family controlled with a relative majority but in 
which the family members participate in the board 
of directors. Therefore, we require that at least one 
family member is a shareholder (Caprio et al., 2011) 
and at least another family member is a member of 
the board of directors, following Corbetta and 
Tomaselli (1996) and Klein (2000). These conditions 
provide us with a dichotomous variable assuming a 
value of 1 for FFs and 0 for NFFs. 
Then, we measured the level of FI by 
considering: 1) the FIO, that is, the percentage of 
shares owned by family members, and 2) the FIM, 
that is, the percentage of family members on the 
executive board. In this way, we can observe the 
impact on strategic choices of family participation in 
both the ownership and the decision-making process 
(e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
 
3.4. Regression models 
 
In order to test the hypotheses related to both the 
acquisition propensity and type, we performed 
maximum-likelihood logit models, in which the 
dependent variable is the M&A strategy. However, 
when M&A is expressed as the yearly number of 
operations (H1), we used ordered, multinomial 
logistic regression, and GLS, for the ordered and 
unordered categorical and continuous measure of 
the dependent variable, respectively. On the other 
hand, when M&A is observed in terms of the type of 
strategy (H2, H3, and H4), we adopted only 
multinomial logistic regression, where the 
dependent variable is coded as one of four 
categories: no M&A strategy, diversification strategy, 
concentration strategy, and internationalization 
strategy. Specifically, hypotheses H1a to H4a 
comparing FFs to NFFs were tested using the 
following general regression equation: 
 
                             
                           
          
                    
                     
(1) 
 
To explore if the propensity to implement a 
given M&A strategy is higher (lower) among FFs, and 
thereby test hypotheses H1b-c to H4b-c, we replaced 
the dummy variable by two continuous variables, 
F_OWN and F_EXE. 
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(2) 
 
                                                                         
                                                                             
                                                                
(3) 
Finally, to test the relationship between FFs, 
NFFs, and performance (H5a), we adopted the 
following general regression equation 3. 
Again, the dummy variable F_FIRM was replaced 
by the two continuous variables, F_OWN and F_EXE, 
when we tested the relationship between FI and 
performance, that is, H5b-c. Table 1 describes the 
dependent, independent, and control variables 
included in the abovementioned regression models. 
All variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% in order 
to reduce the impact of outlier values. We measure 
M&A performance under a multidimensional 
approach, along with both market and accounting 
dimension on a medium-term scale that is one year 
after the acquisition vis-a-vis one year before the 
conclusion, with zero being the year of M&A (e.g. 
Morosini & Singh, 1994). 
 
Table 1. Variable descriptions 
 
Panel A. Description of dependent and independent variables 
 
Variable of interest Description Comment 
M&A (propensity) 
1) Dummy variable taking a value of 1 in presence of M&A, 0 
otherwise. 
Dependent variable for the Eq. 1 
and 2, testing H1.  
2) Each of the four categories of number of M&A. It takes the value 
of 0 for no M&A, 1 for single M&A, 2 for 2-3 M&As; 3 for 4 or more 
M&As. 
 3) Continuous variable measuring the yearly number of M&A. 
M&A (type) 
4) Each of the four categories of M&A strategies. It takes the value of 
0 for no M&A strategy (base category), 1 for concentration, 2 for 
diversification, and 3 for internationalization. 
Dependent variable for the Eq. 1 
and 2, testing H2, H3, and H4. 
CONCENTR Continuous variable proxying for the number of concentration M&A. 
Independent variables for the 
Eq. 3. 
DIVERSIF Continuous variable proxying for the number of diversification M&A. 
INTERNAT 
Continuous variable proxying for the number of internationalization 
M&A. 
F_FIRM 
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 whether the company is an FF, 0 
otherwise. 
Independent variable for the Eq. 
1 and 3. 
F_OWN 
Percentage variable proxying for family ownership, by considering 
the number of shares held by the family. 
Main independent variables for 
the Eq. 2. 
F_EXE 
Percentage variable proxying for the family presence on family 
executives, by considering the number of family members seating on 
the executive board. 
PERFORM 
1) Market performance proxied by the CAR change across three 
years. Dependent variable for the Eq. 3, 
testing H5. 2) Accounting performance proxied by the log of the change in sales 
on assets ratio. 
 
Panel B. Control variables (Part I) 
 
Control 
variables 
 
Relationships with the dependent variables 
M&A PERFORM 
SIZE 
Natural logarithm of 
the firm‟s sales. 
Positively related to the number of M&As 
(Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Miller et 
al., 2010; Caprio et al., 2011), to 
specialisation and related diversification 
strategies (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-
Requejo, 2012; Trasobares & Gorriz, 
2015), and to internationalization 
strategies (Zahra, 2003). 
 
LEV 
Debt-to-equity ratio as 
a proxy of the 
financial risk. 
Competing effects on the propensity to 
acquire (Caprio et al., 2011). Positively 
related to specialization and pure 
unrelated diversification strategies 
(Trasobares & Gorriz, 2015). Negatively 
related to diversification (Feito-Ruiz & 
Menéndez-Requejo, 2012). 
Negatively related to the performance 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Martinez et al., 
2007; Andres, 2008). 
MTB Market-to-book ratio. 
Negatively related to acquisition volume 
(Caprio et al., 2011) and diversification 
strategy (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 
2012). 
Positively related to the market 
performance by construction. 
ROA Return on assets ratio. 
Positively related to M&As propensity 
(Caprio et al., 2011). 
 
FCFO 
Free cash flow from 
operations divided for 
the book value of total 
assets. 
Positively related to M&As propensity 
(Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008). 
 
BETA 
Firm‟s beta as a proxy 
of the market risk. 
Negatively related to the number of M&As 
(Miller et al., 2010). 
 
AGE 
A number of years 
since the firm‟s 
foundation. Collected 
only for FFs, as a 
proxy of generation. 
Positively related to specialization 
strategies (Trasobares & Gorriz, 2015), 
and international sales (Zahra, 2003). 
Negatively related to performance 
(Westhead & Howorth, 2006; Martinez et 
al., 2007). 
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Panel B. Control variables (Part II) 
 
Control 
variables 
 
Relationships with the dependent variables 
M&A PERFORM 
CRISIS 
Dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 
for observations from 
2009 to 2011; 0 
otherwise. 
Positively related to acquisition 
propensity (Karim & Mitchell, 2000) and 
diversification strategies (Miller et al., 
2010). 
Positively related to post M&As 
performance (Wan & Yiu, 2009). 
RSIZE 
Relative deal size as 
deal market value on 
acquirer market value 
ratio. 
 
Negatively related to post M&As 
performance (Moeller, Schlingemann & 
Stulz, 2004; André et al., 2014). 
LISTED 
Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 
whether the target 
company is listed. 
 
Negatively related to post M&As 
performance (Officer, 2007; André et al. 
2014). 
D_INDUSTRY 
Dummy variables for 
industry fixed-effects. 
(Not directly observed) (Not directly observed) 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution sample of FFs and 
NFFs by sector. In our sample, while FFs operate 
mainly in trade (consumer goods and services) and 
industrial sectors, NFFs can be observed mainly in 
industrial, telecommunication, and utility sectors. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
yearly number of M&As and the results of a 
difference-in-means t-test. This variable differs 
statistically between FFs and NFFs (Pearson Chi2 (3) = 
11.143; significance Pr = .011). 
 
Table 2. Sample distribution by industry 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of M&As 
 
 Family firms Non-family firms Total 
0 402 329 731 
1 98 67 165 
2-3 29 45 74 
≥4 6 11 17 
Total 535 452 987 
 
Because the Chi2 value is significant at 5% (the 
distributions are different), we could claim that 
there is a relationship between being an FF and the 
number of M&As, enabling the differences between 
FFs and NFFs to be explored further. 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics and 
Pearson correlations for both the full sample (Panel 
A) and the FF sample (Panel B). In the full sample, 
the number of M&As is negatively and significantly 
correlated to the dummy variable proxying for FFs 
(F_FAM), while the type of acquisition strategy is not 
significantly correlated to F_FAM. Most control 
variables are significantly correlated to the main of 
variables of interest with the expected signs. 
Interestingly, the number and type of M&As are all 
negatively and significantly correlated to the 
variable proxying for the years of the financial crisis. 
As for the restricted sample of FFs, the results are 
very similar. Although FIO is not correlated to the 
other variables of interest, FIM is correlated to the 
number of M&As. For the sake of brevity, we do not 
show the correlation matrix of variables included in 
the sub-sample adopted for performing Eq. 3. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations (Part I) 
 
Panel A. Full sample (n=987) 
  
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
M&A 
(number) 
.404 .846          
2 M&A (type) .482 .937 .726*         
3 ROA -.222 15.952 .056 .068*        
4 F_FAM .542 .498 -.082* .011 .108*       
5 SIZE (.000) 8,740,623 1,420,391 .162* .153* .056 -.118*      
6 LEV 1.897 8.863 -.022 -.025 -.022 -.049 -.001     
7 MTB 1.976 4.860 .075* .079* .009 -.061 .009 .067*    
8 FCFO .053 .729 -.004 -.002 .061 .046 .010 -.018 -.012   
9 BETA 1.051 .456 .129* .080* -.076* .034 .064 -.013 .076* -.030  
10 CRISIS .571 .495 -.143* -.114* -.102* .009 -.006 .024 -.156* -.056 .066* 
 
 
No. 
of 
firms 
No.
of 
obs. 
% 
Basic 
materials 
Consumer 
goods 
Consumer 
services 
Health 
Care 
Industrials 
Oil 
& 
gas 
Technology Telecommunication Utilities 
FFs 76 535 54.2 14 154 103 14 203 14 19 7 7 
NFFs 65 452 45.8 14 42 72 7 112 14 86 21 84 
Total 141 987 100 28 196 175 21 315 28 105 28 91 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations (Part II) 
 
Panel B. Family firms sample (n=535) 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
M&A 
(number) 
.340 .703          
2 M&A (type) .492 .969 .741*         
3 ROA 1.369 7.468 .065 .070        
4 F_OWN .594 .119 -.085 -.079 .096*       
5 F_EXE .558 .313 -.126* -.084 -.09* .146*      
6 SIZE (.000) 396,000 1,070,000 .142* .086 .161* .055 -.128*     
7 LEV 1.497 3.507 .011 .004 -.082 -.042 -.075 .147*    
8 MTB 1.705 3.603 .138* .154* .245* .004 -.066 .072 .001   
9 FCFO .083 .969 -.012 -.011 .038 -.043 -.10* .004 -.029 .016  
10 BETA 1.064 .462 .098* .035 -.109* -.164* -.097* .084 .015 .094* -.053 
Note: * denotes significance at 5% level or better 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis  
 
In order to test the hypotheses formulated in 
Section 2, we adopted a set of different models, both 
logistic and linear. First, we used an RE panel 
regression model given that our data were both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal and that RE were 
found to be present in the data. The appropriateness 
of RE was verified using the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test, which examines 
whether fixed effects (FE) or RE are preferred to OLS. 
The Breusch-Pagan LM test showed a test statistic of 
104.03~Chi2 (1) p<.000 and, therefore, RE performed 
better than OLS. Then, we used the Hausman test to 
ensure that the model had RE and not FE. Since FE 
was not a valid statistical option (test statistic = 
4.22~Chi2 (8), p=.837), RE was used in the analysis. 
Following Dyer and Whetten (2006), who similarly 
find RE in their panel data of FFs, we theoretically 
assumed that the RE estimator is justified because 
there is no reason to believe that any unobserved 
variables captured by the composite error term are 
correlated with the regressors. 
As for acquisition propensity testing H1a, 
Model 1 of Table 5 shows the results of a 
preliminary analysis using a simple binary logit 
regression model. Although F_FIRM has a positive 
sign, so that FFs would be more likely to perform 
M&As than NFFs, this relationship is not statistically 
significant. However, we undertook a more in-depth 
analysis by considering multiple M&As, including the 
possibility of having more than one M&A in a single 
year. We first considered this variable as ordered 
categorically (Model 2). The reported likelihood ratio 
test (85.21~Chi2 (1), p<.000) shows that there is 
enough variability between firms to favor an RE 
ordered logistic regression over a standard ordered 
logistic regression (not tabulated). The greater is the 
number of M&As, the lower is the probability of 
being implemented by an FF, and we found the 
expected negative but still not significant 
relationship for the F_FIRM variable. Then, we 
considered M&As as a continuous variable, that is a 
yearly total number of M&As (Model 3). Again, 
results of the RE GLS regression model show a 
negative sign but no statistical significance. 
Finally, we considered M&As as an unordered 
variable, that is, all levels within the variable are 
equivalent in terms of importance (Model 4). The 
probability that an FF performed a number of M&As 
ranging between 0 and 4 or more was distributed in 
four classes and modeled using Stata‟s feature for 
generalized linear latent and mixed models 
(GLLAMM) (Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles, & Skrondal, 2001), 
an estimation that is becoming more commonly 
used in social sciences, and specifying the 
multinomial logit link. The multinomial logit model 
with RE enabled us to overcome the endogeneity 
problem and control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity, obtaining a more accurate 
approximation and drawing causal inferences (Hsiao, 
1985). Specifically, while both Gauss–Hermite 
quadrature and adaptive quadrature might be used 
to estimate multinomial logit cases, adaptive 
quadrature is considered advantageous in terms of 
accuracy because it uses posterior RE distribution in 
the estimation process so that it is more reliable 
than other methods. 
Interestingly, this additional and sophisticated 
model using the GLLAMM approach shows a 
statistically significant difference between FFs and 
NFFs. When more than one M&A is performed, FFs 
are less likely to implement acquisition strategies 
than NFFs, and this expected relationship is stronger 
(significant at .05) when the number of M&As is 
higher than (or equal to) four. Therefore, it is 
possible to infer that in our sample over a threshold 
of just one M&A, FFs realize a lower number of 
M&As than NFFs. To ease the interpretation of the 
results, we reported odds ratios rather than 
coefficients. Therefore, the propensity to realize, for 
example, four or more M&A deals for a year (vs. no 
M&As at all) is about 72% [(.281 – 1)*100)] lower for 
FFs relative to NFFs (or, similarly, about 3,6 times 
more for NFFs [1/.281)]), other things being equal. 
Therefore, we can confirm our H1a. Among control 
variables, BETA and CRISIS are strongly related to 
the different proxies of the dependent variable. 
BETA has a positive sign, so the higher is the 
operational risk, the higher is the probability to 
perform M&As, while CRISIS shows an expected 
negative sign, so that during the financial crisis 
years (2009–2011), this probability drops, except for 
the case of four or more M&As. 
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Table 5. Results of RE panel binary, ordinal, and multinomial logistic regression and GLS regression for 
number of M&As (FFs vs. NFFs) 
 
 Es Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
 
RE binary 
LOGIT 
RE ordered 
LOGIT 
RE  
GLS 
RE multinomial unordered  
LOGIT (GLLAMM) 
Dependent Var.  
(0=No M&A; 
1=M&A) 
#M&A 
(four categories) 
Continuous 
#M&A 
1 M&A 2-3 M&As ≥4 M&As 
Independent 
Var. 
       
F_FIRM - 1.074 (0.21) .849 (-0.47) -.119 (-1.18) 1.395 (1.44) .571 (-1.70)* .281 (-2.01)** 
SIZE + 1.076 (1.08) 1.091 (1.24)* .031 (1.94)* 1.046 (0.91) 1.091 (1.23) 1.263 (1.50) 
LEV
 
+/- .995 (-0.82) .998 (-0.53) .000 (0.16) .989 (-0.58) .997 (-0.17) 1.005 (-0.06) 
MTB
 
+ 1.085 (2.24)** 1.064 (1.94)* .014 (1.42)* 1.064 (1.52) 1.085 (1.87)* 1.145 (1.11) 
ROA + 1.017 (1.52) 1.012 (1.32) .001 (1.21) 1.012 (0.97) 1.008 (0.53) 1.018 (0.38) 
FCFO - .892 (-1.71)* .898 (-1.62) -.025 (-3.45)*** .950 (-0.32) .768 (-0.39) .667 (-0.24) 
BETA + 2.178 (3.09)*** 2.105 (3.10)*** .244 (3.00)*** 1.800 (2.74)*** 1.526 (1.34) 4.852 (3.43)*** 
CRISIS - .394 (-4.22)*** .412 (-4.15)*** -.273 (-3.84)*** .536 (-3.07)*** .394 (-3.20)*** .398 (2.78) 
Intercept  .018 (-2.71)*** - -.302 (-0.78) .021 (-3.43)*** .016 (-2.85)*** .000 (-1.61)*** 
Cut1   3.930 (2.57)**     
Cut2   5.622 (3.59)***     
Cut3   7.615 (4.85)***     
N=865    
LR/Wald chi2 
R2 / Pseudo R2 
 62.23*** 85.21*** 
73.78*** 
0.1596 
139.29*** 
0.103 
Log Likelihood  -415.593 -595.961 - -605.355 
AIC 
(BIC) 
 
867.185 
(952.727) 
1,231.922 
(1,326.968) 
- 
1,312.71 
(1,555.076) 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. For logit models, odds ratios are shown instead of 
coefficients (Z values in parentheses). Reference category is “no M&A”. Robust standard errors clustered by the firm are used. All 
regressions models include industry fixed effects (not reported) 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the abovementioned 
analyses performed only on the sub-sample of FFs. 
However, since for multinomial logit regression 
some variables proxying for FI were found with no 
values within the last M&A category, in order to 
avoid an overfitting problem, we had to merge the 
second and third categories of M&As. Overall, the 
signs of F_OWN and F_EXE are negative, as expected. 
Again, while simple binary or ordered logit 
regressions (Models 1 and 2) do not produce 
significant (or only weak) results, by adopting a 
GLLAMM (Model 4), we found negative and 
significant relationships between the proxies of FI 
and the propensity to perform M&As. 
Specifically, the higher is the presence of family 
members in ownership for one M&A, and in the 
executive committee for two or more M&As, the 
lower is the number of M&As performed. By 
numbers, this means that an increase of 1% of FIO 
(FIM) leads to a reduction of about 86% (83%) of the 
odds to perform one (two or more) M&As. In 
summary, with regard to the impact of FI on the 
acquisition propensity, we could confirm hypotheses 
H1b and H1c. 
 
 
Table 6. Results of RE panel binary, ordinal, and multinomial logistic regression and GLS regression for 
number of M&As (FF sample) 
 
 ES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
 
RE binary 
LOGIT 
RE ordered 
LOGIT 
RE 
GLS 
RE multinomial unordered 
LOGIT (GLLAMM) 
Dependent Var.  
(0=No M&A; 
1=M&A) 
#M&A 
(four categories) 
Continuous #M&A 1 M&A ≥2 M&As 
Independ. Var.       
F_OWN - .323 (-0.60) .537 (-0.35) -.117 (-0.31) .144 (-1.69)* .041 (-1.44) 
F_EXE - .769 (-0.42) .587 (-0.94) -.189 (-1.59)* .899 (-0.24) .172 (-2.17)** 
SIZE  + 1.127 (1.13) 1.155 (1.37) .027 (1.47) 1.006 (0.08) 1.370 (1.97)** 
LEV
 
+/- .981 (-0.73) .996 (-0.14) -.001 (-0.24) .972 (-0.87) .980 (-0.31) 
MTB
 
+ 1.183 (1.61) 1.055 (0.70) .014 (1.16) 1.176 (2.00)** 1.229 (1.79)* 
ROA + .987 (-0.60) .989 (-0.55) -.002 (-0.65) .993 (-0.34) .971 (-0.90) 
FCFO - .853 (-1.97)** .861 (-1.84)* -.026 (-2.98)*** .892 (-0.43) .888 (-0.30) 
BETA + 1.662 (1.50) 1.553 (1.37) .144 (1.45) 1.426 (1.22) 1.199 (0.39) 
AGE  - .778 (-0.87) .806 (-0.82) -.012 (-0.20) 1.029 (0.16) .883 (-0.45) 
CRISIS - .449 (-2.74)*** .462 (-2.78)*** -.200 (-3.18)*** .540 (-2.23)** .543 (-1.37) 
Intercept  .057 (-1.67)*  -.039 (-0.13) .270 (-0.84) .002 (-2.12)** 
Cut1   3.284 (2.07)**    
Cut2   5.315 (3.31)***    
Cut3   7.236(4.35)***    
N=476       
LR/Wald chi2  37.32*** 382.71***  70.64*** 
Pseudo R2 / R2    0.2460 0.1110 
Log Likelihood  -229.194 -310.567 26.70*** -282.84 
AIC  
(BIC) 
 
498.387 
(581.695) 
663.133 
(750.607) 
 
640.259 
(730.466) 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. For logit models, odds ratios are shown instead of 
coefficients (Z values in parentheses). Reference category is “no M&A”. Robust standard errors clustered by the company are used. All 
regressions models include industry fixed effects (not reported) 
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Moving to acquisition strategy type, Table 7 shows 
the results of RE panel multinomial logistic 
regression of M&A strategies on the dichotomous 
variable proxying for FFs versus NFFs. Again, we 
modeled the determinants of the company‟s 
alternative M&A strategy choice with a multinomial 
logit model with random unobserved heterogeneity 
in a panel set to account for unobserved individual 
company effects. Specifically, Model 1 considered 
M&As across the three different strategies in an 
aggregate view. In this case, we found no evidence of 
statistically significant differences between FFs and 
NFFs, whatever the M&A strategy. However, when we 
disaggregated concentric vs. conglomerate 
diversification strategies, as well as horizontal vs. 
vertical (in turn, forward vs. backward) 
concentration strategies (Model 2), a negative 
expected relationship was found between being an 
FF and the odds of performing a concentric M&A 
(H2a was accepted). 
 
Table 7. Results of RE panel multinomial logistic regression for aggregate and disaggregate M&A strategies 
(FFs vs. NFFs) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 RE multinomial LOGIT (GLLAMM) (4 categories) RE multinomial LOGIT (GLLAMM) (7 categories) 
 ES Diversific. ES Concentrat. ES Internat. Concentric Conglom. 
Vertical 
forward 
Vertical 
backward 
Horizont. Internat. 
F_FIRM - 
.557 
(-1.38) 
- 
1.066 
(0.24) 
- 
1.180 
(0.56) 
.039 
(-2.47)** 
.947 
(-0.11) 
.803 
(-0.45) 
1.116 
(0.28) 
1.275 
(0.53) 
1.187 
(0.58) 
SIZE - 
.682 
(-4.89)*** 
+ 
1.228 
(3.46)*** 
+ 
1.208 
(2.55)** 
.593 
(-2.44)** 
.675 
(-4.45)*** 
1.003 
(0.02) 
1.219 
(2.15)** 
1.460 
(3.73)**
* 
1.211 
(2.58)*
* 
LEV
 
? 
.983 
(-0.47) 
+ 
.989 
(-0.57) 
? 
.996 
(-0.19) 
.993 
(-0.09) 
.977 
(-0.52) 
.988 
(-0.38) 
.991 
(-0.33) 
.981 
(-0.56) 
.996 
(-0.20) 
MTB
 
- 
.866 
(-2.52)** 
+ 
1.125 
(2.64)*** 
+ 
1.133 
(2.69)*** 
.834 
(-1.11) 
.851 
(-2.61)*** 
1.049 
(0.47) 
1.118 
(2.07)** 
1.173 
(3.03)**
* 
1.140 
(2.73)*
** 
ROA + 
1.011 
(0.45) 
+ 
1.006 
(0.59) 
+ 
1.012 
(0.63) 
1.056 
(0.72) 
1.008 
(0.32) 
1.014 
(0.51) 
1.008 
(0.51) 
1.001 
(-0.08) 
1.011 
(0.61) 
FCFO + 
.933 
(-0.21) 
+ 
.954 
(-0.21)** 
+ 
.845 
(-0.25) 
1.142 
(0.08) 
.851 
(-0.24) 
1.005 
(0.02) 
.561 
(-0.69) 
.989 
(-0.04) 
.837 
(-0.25) 
BETA + 
4.255 
(3.45)*** 
+ 
1.872 
(2.59)** 
+ 
1.399 
(1.20) 
6.629 
(2.15)** 
3.721 
(2.72)*** 
1.458 
(0.80) 
2.739 
(2.82)*** 
1.389 
(0.87) 
1.391 
(1.17) 
CRISIS - 
.220 
(-3.59)*** 
- 
.511 
(-2.95)*** 
- 
.602 
(-1.91)* 
.226 
(-1.52) 
.216 
(-3.28)*** 
.441 
(-1.89)* 
.535 
(-1.84)* 
.526 
(-1.86)* 
.607 
(-
1.88)* 
Intercept  
20.933 
(2.13)** 
 
.001 
(-5.54)*** 
 
.001 
(-
4.44)*** 
201.532 
(1.51) 
6.974 
(1.16) 
.035 
(-1.6) 
.000 
(-
4.22)*** 
.000 
(-
5.35)*** 
.001 
(-
4.46)*
** 
N=856   
LR/Wald 
chi2 
203.02*** 255.29*** 
Pseudo R2 .142 .150 
Log 
Likelihood 
-613.583 -723.882 
AIC (BIC) 1,329.166 (1,571.531) 1,641.764 (2,102.734) 
Note: Reference category is “no M&A”. Odds ratios are shown instead of coefficients (Z values in parentheses) 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by the company are 
used. All regressions models include industry fixed effects (not reported) 
 
Again, Table 8 shows the results of the 
abovementioned analyses performed only on the 
sub-sample of FFs. However, differently from 
Table 7, the reduced number of observations did not 
allow us to disaggregate the three main acquisition 
strategies. Overall, the higher is the FIO, the lower is 
the probability of performing strategies of 
diversification (H2b was accepted) and 
internationalization (H4b-c were accepted). 
 
 
Table 8. Results of RE panel multinomial logistic regression for aggregate M&A strategies (FF sample) 
 
 RE Multinomial LOGIT (GLLAMM) (4 categories) 
 ES Diversification ES Concentration ES Internationalization 
F_OWN - .010 (-2.07)** - .246 (-0.95) - .034 (-1.83)* 
F_EXE - 7.021 (1.66)* - .563 (-0.94) - .363 (-1.69)* 
SIZE - .689 (-2.62)*** + 1.218 (1.80)* + 1.231 (1.62) 
LEV
 
?
 
.968 (-0.26) + .965 (-1.01) ? .977 (-0.45) 
MTB
 
-
 
.174 (-3.01)*** + 1.049 (0.39) + 1.457 (3.91)*** 
ROA + .991 (-0.11) + .998 (-0.09) + .972 (-1.16) 
FCFO + .980 (-0.07) + .944 (-0.17) + .375 (-0.62) 
BETA + 4.260 (1.94)* + 1.489 (1.09) + .834 (-0.46) 
AGE  ? .877 (-0.35) + 1.418 (1.48) + .640 (-1.88)* 
CRISIS - .067 (-3.47)*** - .533 (-1.83)* - .652 (-1.16) 
Intercept  22.729 (1.66)*  .002 (-2.76)***  .057 (-1.23) 
N=476  
LR/Wald chi2 146.00 
Pseudo R2 0.1970 
Log Likelihood -297.594 
AIC (BIC) 707.189 (936.807) 
Note: Reference category is “no M&A”. Odds ratios are shown instead of coefficients (Z values in parentheses) 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by the company are 
used. All regressions models include industry fixed effects (not reported) 
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Finally, with regard to post-acquisition 
performance, Table 9 shows the results of the 
performance (proxied by a change in both CAR and 
sales-on-assets ratio) regressed on F_FIRM 
(Models 1–2) and FI proxies (Models 3–4). All models 
used robust errors clustered for both company and 
year (Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2010).  
FFs do not differ from NFFs with regard to 
post-acquisition performance and the acquisition 
type does not affect the performance, except for a 
weak and positive impact of diversification on 
accounting-based performance. However, we find 
that the relationship between CAR and 
diversification strategies is significantly and 
negatively moderated by the family firm variable. 
Thus, family firms experience a lower performance 
in terms of CAR when the number of diversification 
strategies increase (H5a can be accepted). This result 
is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny‟s 
(1990) study, who find acquisitions with a 
diversifying character generally destroy shareholder 
wealth.  
In addition, when we look at the subsample of 
family firms, while diversification strategies 
positively affect sales-on-assets ratio, the significant 
and positive interaction term between FIO and 
diversification means that accounting performance 
increases when family involvement in ownership is 
higher. Finally, a weak and positive interaction is 
found for FIM and concentration strategies (H5b-c 
were accepted). 
Although our results are mixed as to the 
performance measure adopted, this is quite 
expected considering the relevant difference 
between market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures. When multiple dimensions 
are used, the M&A scholars frequently compare 
market and accounting types of measures and test 
the convergence of results across the measures. 
However, it does not make sense to compare market 
measures such as CAR (a prediction of future 
company performance) with accounting measures (a 
measure of historical performance). This represents 
a common mistake since reaching a consensus upon 
the M&A measurement is not possible or desirable 
(Meglio & Risberg, 2011). 
In addition, our results are not significant as to 
acquisition strategies. Previous research found that 
M&As do not create value for all the stakeholders 
(Datta et al., 1992). In addition, sometimes the 
integration process fails to produce the expected 
benefits because there are no true synergies to be 
had from an acquisition, such as in the case of 
acquisitions driven by issues of agency and self-
serving behaviour of managers (Kroll et al., 1997) or 
when M&As have other goals than increasing 
shareholder value, such as in the case of family 
firms. However, we contribute to previous research 
by introducing interaction terms and detecting new 
relationships between acquisition strategies and 
familiness. 
 
 
Table 9. Results of regression for performance (both FFs vs. NFFs and only FF sample) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Var. CAR Sales/Assets ratio CAR Sales/Assets ratio 
F_FIRM .074 (1.40) .021 (.29)   
F_OWN   .010 (.01) -.266 (-1.56) 
F_EXE   .239 (1.39) .126* (1.95) 
CONCENTR -.043 (-1.06) -.002 (-.23) -.038 (-.15) .054 (1.62) 
DIVERSIF -.046 (-1.00) .049* (1.77) .358 (.87) .184** (2.29) 
INTERNAT -.033 (-.99) -.003 (-.36) -.057 (-.70) .070 (.84) 
LEV .021 (1.04) .030 (.98) .058* (1.96) .062 (1.43) 
MTB -.005* (-1.96) .003 (1.14) .003 (.08) -.002 (-.28) 
AGE
 
  -.072 (-1.21) -.036 (-1.25) 
LISTED -.029 (-.46) .058 (1.42) -.059 (-.75) .062 (1.48) 
RSIZE -.003 (-.47) -.009* (-1.91) .007 (.18) -.032** (-2.56) 
CRISIS .123* (1.84) -.001 (-.03) .198 (1.44) .004 (.12) 
F_FIRM* CONCENTR -.083 (-1.11) .024* (1.85)   
F_FIRM* DIVERSIF -.230*** (-3.74) .061 (.99)   
F_FIRM* INTERNAT -.060 (-.97) .027* (1.81)   
F_OWN* CONCENTR   -.342 (-.31) .520 (1.31) 
F_EXE* CONCENTR   .273 (.86) .117* (1.72) 
F_OWN* DIVERSIF   -2.625 (-1.35) 1.729** (2.18) 
F_EXE*DIVERSIF   .418 (1.27) .095 (.38) 
F_OWN* INTERNAT   -.176 (-.41) .364 (1.15) 
F_EXE* INTERNAT   .186 (1.10) .100 (.59) 
Intercept .145* (1.70) -.184** (-2.03) .100 (.42) -.248 (-1.56) 
N 244 128 
R2 .1142 .1213 .2710 .4114 
Note: “t” values in parentheses 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by both company and 
time are used 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Firms‟ family nature, such as FI degree, aids 
understanding of companies‟ strategic behavior. 
Given the special connotation of agency conflict in 
FFs (Chrisman et al., 2004; 2007), our study aimed to 
investigate if the aforementioned FFs‟ peculiarities 
affect their acquisition behavior as well as post-
acquisition performance in the Italian context, in a 
period in which the financial crisis occurred. In 
order to deepen our analysis, we considered an issue 
that has been less detailed in previous studies: 
strategy type (diversifying, integrated, and cross-
border M&As). 
First, we guessed whether FFs have a different 
acquisition propensity to NFFs. After selecting the 
GLLAMM approach for its stronger methodological 
power, we found that over the threshold of just one 
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M&A, FFs realize a lower number of M&A than NFFs. 
This result is aligned with other authors‟ empirical 
evidence demonstrating a lower propensity for 
M&As by FFs (e.g. Miller et al., 2010; Caprio et al., 
2011). 
Our analysis suggests that the family business 
model facilitates pursuing family goals oriented 
toward the preservation of firms (Shepherd & Zahra, 
2003) and SEW (Chrisman et al., 2004; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007), rather than toward the implementation 
of risky deals (Miller et al., 2010; Calabrò et al., 
2013). In fact, the agency conflict mitigation and the 
family owners‟ and managers‟ entrenchment 
(Chrisman et al., 2007), contribute to a 
differentiation of the strategic behavior of FFs and 
of NFFs, resulting in a lower number of concluded 
M&As for FFs (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). An 
interesting result arises from the analysis of the 
control variables. In fact, we found that during the 
financial crisis years, the probability of M&A 
implementation decreased, except for the case of 
four or more M&A. 
However, our analysis shows that this strategy 
is pursued mainly by intensive buyer companies. 
The results regarding the impact of FI on M&As 
strengthened this result. In fact, the higher is the FIO 
and FIM, the lower is the number of M&As (Bauguess 
& Stegemoller, 2008; Miller et al., 2010; Calabrò et 
al., 2013). This result suggests that strategic 
behavior is not generalizable to all FFs: FFs have 
different M&A propensity in relation to FI degree. In 
that sense, we provided empirical evidence that FI 
incentivizes the alignment of interests between 
family owners and management, thereby reducing 
agency conflict (Ho & Kang, 2013; Wang, 2006). 
Considering M&A types, we did not find that 
being an FF influences the realization of different 
strategies, even though concentric diversification 
strategies are less likely to be performed by FFs. In 
addition, we found that a higher FIO is related to a 
lower probability to perform diversification and 
cross-border M&As. Both the literature (Menéndez-
Requejo, 2005; Sciascia et al., 2012; Calabrò et al., 
2013) and our theoretical arguments support the 
negative relationship between FIO and cross-border 
M&A propensity. In fact, these strategies are 
considered risky and in need of management 
expertise. Instead, our hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between FIO and diversification is 
aligned with the evidence of Caprio et al. (2011) and 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a). Considering the 
behavioral agency perspective proposed by Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2007) to motivate FF strategic choices, 
we can explain this finding as a result of the 
subjectivity of risk perception, since diversification 
is generally considered a strategy capable of 
mitigating corporate risks. In that sense, FFs‟ 
strategic choices reflect the family principals‟ 
aversion to the loss of SEW. As Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2010) state, the fear of SEW dilution may increase 
an owner‟s risk perception and a consequent 
aversion to this kind of strategy. Their findings 
suggesting that FFs have a lower propensity to 
diversify than NFFs, are aligned with those of 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) and Berrone et al. (2010), 
which argue that FFs are willing to assume a higher 
financial risk or performance hazard in order to 
preserve from potential SEW losses. By introducing 
the performance variability, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2010) show that, due to the higher risk of failure as 
a consequence of the concentration of ownership in 
family firms, the negative relation between the 
family control and the overall diversification is 
attenuated by the increase of the business risk and 
of the performance hazard. International 
diversification, instead, is favoured in FFs only when 
performance hazard increases. Specifically, studies 
in agency theory show that the increase of family 
ownership promotes unrelated M&As, as this 
facilitates risk reduction (Miller et al. 2010). Shifting 
from the agency theory to the behavioural agency 
theory perspective, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2018) 
demonstrate that, when family firms operate in a 
vulnerability condition, they choice related M&As 
less than NFFs, in order to take advantage of the 
financial perspectives associated with these 
strategies. 
Moreover, since our analysis shows that the 
higher is the family presence in the management, 
the lower is the probability of performing cross-
border M&As, an entrenchment effect does exist, 
leading managers to behave as family stewards, 
thereby avoiding the M&A type considered risky. 
Finally, although post-M&A performances do not 
differ when comparing FFs and NFFs, we found that 
a moderating role of FFs exists in explaining the 
impact of diversifying strategies on performance. 
This result does corroborate that the family business 
model affects the results of the implemented 
strategies. 
Our study contributes to the literature on FFs, 
analysing their propensity to develop important 
strategies, such as M&As, in the Italian context 
during a period of severe financial crisis. We make a 
twofold contribution since our study undertakes 
both a comparison of FFs and NNFs and an analysis 
to investigate the impact of FIO and FIM on the 
strategic decisions of FFs. Previous studies devoted 
to the study of FFs‟ strategic behaviour have not 
investigated the role of the family involvement in 
the choice of the type of strategy to be implemented 
(Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; Caprio et al., 2011; 
Trasobares & Gorriz, 2015; Lins et al., 2013) or were 
settled in a different institutional context (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2018). Rossi and Volpin (2004) suggest 
that the M&A activity is more substantial in 
countries where capital markets are more developed, 
legal enforcement and minorities‟ protection are 
stronger and accounting standards are more 
effective. As a matter of fact, Italy does not belong 
to this group (Barth et al., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1999; Barca & Becht, 2001). 
The comparative analysis of different types of 
strategies and post-M&A performance is another 
relevant contribution. In fact, previous studies in the 
field of FFs and M&As (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; 
2018) considered FFs performances as possible 
determinants of the decision to acquire or not and 
as to which type of diversification should be 
implemented in a SEW perspective.  
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